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Thirty Years of Immigration Policy and Research:
Labor Force Lessons
Vernon M. Briggs, Jr.
Cornell University
At the time of its passage, the Immigration Act of 1965 was called "the most far-
reaching revision of immigration policy" since the imposition of the first numerical quotas in
1921.1 Subsequent events have shown that this legislation led directly to the revival of the
phenomenon of mass immigration from out the nation's distant past.2 Immigration, which
had been of declining significance to the nation's welfare for over 50 years, soon again
became a major factor in the nation's economic, social and political life. Indeed, a
comprehensive study by an international panel of social science scholars concluded its
assessment of U.S. society in the mid-1980s with the observation that "America's biggest
import is people" and the conclusion that "at a time when attention is directed to the general
decline in American exceptionalism, American immigration continues to flow at a rate
unknown elsewhere in the world. ,,3
Because immigration involves the movement of people rather than of products, it is
the labor market that is ultimately at the heart of any effort to assess the significance of the
immigration issue. Fundamentally, immigration is an economic issue, although as events
have shown, public policy has seldom been formed on this basis. Immigrants must work to
support themselves or they must be supported by other people who do. The key issues that
emerge, as a consequence, pertain to what impact immigrants have on the size, composition,
and distribution of the nation's labor force. It includes not only their employment patterns
2but also how they influence their labor market competitors (the native born and the already
naturalized labor force). Thus, there are quantitative issues (the size of the flow), qualitative
issues (the skill composition) and competitive issues (the geographic, occupational and
industrial employment patterns) involved in any effort to assess what has transpired.
The Peculiar Nature of the Immigration Policy
Unlike most elements of public policy interventions that seek to influence labor
market conditions, immigration policy is a special case. It is purely a discretionary act of
government. In the contemporary world, divided into sovereign nation states, there is no
obligation for any nation to allow others to enter or to work or to permanently settle. In fact,
most nations do not admit immigrants for permanent settlement. The Universal Declaration
of Human Rights states that no nation state should force people to stay within its borders;
but there is no parallel obligation on any nation to accept outsiders into its sovereign
territory.4 There is no right to immigrate. Hence, as with any public policy initiative, the
first step in assessing the Immigration Act of 1965 is to acertain what were its intended
objectives at the time of its enactment.
The primary motivation for passage of the legislation was to end the overt
discrimination embodied in the nation's immigration laws that had been in effect since 1924.
That earlier legislation had two distinct features: it set the level of immigration for the
Eastern Hemisphere at a low level (about 154,000 a year) and it was blatently
discriminatory-- favoring Western and Northern European countries while disfavoring
immigration from Eastern and Southern Europe and (in conjunction with other legislation)
virtually prohibiting immigration from all Asian countries. There were no restrictions,
3however, placed on Western Hemisphere immigration (except those provisions that exclude
certain categories of would-be immigrants from any country, dealing mostly with moral,
health, and ideological characteristics). Thus, the paramount goal of the 1965 Act was to
achieve a non-discriminatory immigration policy (as part of the broader civil rights
movement of that era). The reformers "were so incensed with the ethnocentrism of the laws
of the past that they spent virtually all of their energies seeking to eliminate the country of
origin provisions" and, as a consequence, "they gave very little attention to the substance or
long range implications of the policy that would replace them. ,,5 In a nutshell, there is the
story of what has subsequently transpired.
There was no shortage of labor in 1965 that required an increase in immigration.
Indeed, 1965 was exactly the year that the post-war "baby boom" hit the labor market. One
million more people turned 18 years old (the primary labor force entry age for full-:time job
seeking) that year and that high level persisted for the next 16 years. Already worried about
the adverse effects of foreign workers on citizen workers, the Johnson Administration
(following through on a Kennedy Administration initiative) had terminated the Mexican
Labor Program (i.e., the infamous "bracero program") only ten months before the
Immigration Act of 1965 was signed. Moreover, in the presidential campaign of 1964, the
Republican Party had raised the specter of massive job displacement if the immigration
legislation (initially proposed in 1963 by the Kennedy Administration) were to be enacted by
the Johnson Administration after the election.6 Congress, therefore, was sensitive to the
change and, for that reason, it significantly tightened the labor certification requirements that
4applied to non-family and non-refugee admissions that are contained in the Immigration Act
of 1965.
It was also the case that the Immigration Act of 1965 was passed the same year that
the equal employment opportunity provisions (i.e., Title VII) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
went into effect (i.e., on July 1, 1965). Indeed, a strong case can be made that the passage
of the Immigration Act of 1965 was itself a manifestation of the achievement of the nation's
civil rights agenda. Its primary goal was to end the nation's overt racism toward the
external world. It is ironic that the domestic civil rights legislation was primarily concerned
with improving the economic status of black Americans. Yet no racial group has benefited
less over the ensuing years from immigration nor been more adversely affected by what
immigration reform in 1965 has produced.
It is obvious, in retrospect, that the nation-changing ramifications of the Immigration
Act of 1965 were not foreseen by its proponents at the time of its passage. In testimony
prior to its passage, Secretary of State Dean Rusk stated that "the significance of immigration
for the United States now depends less on numbers than on the quality of the immigrants. ,,7
Congressman Emanuel Cellar (D-NY), the sponsor of the bill in the House of
Representatives, stated during the final floor debate that "there will not be comparatively,
many Asians or Africans entering the country... since few could immigrate from those
countries because they have no family ties to the United States. "8 Senator Edward Kennedy,
(D-Mass), the floor manager of the bill in the Senate stated "this bill is not concerned with
increasing immigration to this country, nor will it lower any of the high standards we apply
in the selection of immigrants."9 Kennedy also said "our cities will not be flooded with a
5million immigrants annually"; that "the ethnic mix of this country will not be upset." and "it
[the pending bill] would not cause American workers to lose their jobs." 10
As subsequent research has now shown, none of these assurances has proved to be
valid.
The Instrumental Policy Features of the Immigration Act of 1965
The key features of the Immigration Act of 1965 that have instrumentally affected
subsequent events transcend the vision of ending overt ethnocentrism. Prior to its passage,
the preference system that had been in place since 1952 was one that set human resource
concerns as the major objective of the nation's immigration policy. The extant system had
reserved the highest preference category (i.e., the 1st preference) for workers with a level of
education, technical training, special experiences, and exceptional abilities. Half of all
available visas were set aside for this group. The Immigration Act of 1965, however,
introduced the notion of "family reunification" as the highest priority --setting aside 74
percent of the visas for such persons (later increased to 80 percent in 1980) and it
downgraded labor needs to the third and sixth level preferences of a seven preference
admission system.ll Thus, the focus of the nation's immigration policy shifted. Had the
scale of immigration remained at its low pre-1965 levels, this shift in focus may not have
proved significant. But as will be shown, the scale of immigration increased dramatically
and the consequences of the shift from meeting human resource needs to family reunification
has proven to have had monumental consequences for the nation's labor force.
Furthermore, the Immigration Act of 1965 also introduced a preference category for
the admission of refugees. This is the first time in the history of U.S. immigration law that
6refugees were given statutory recognition as being a permanent feature of U.S. immigration
policy. Refugees have proven to be a major source of post-1965 immigrants and,
subsequently, of additional family related immigrants.
The Act of 1965 is also significant for what it did not do. Namely, it failed to
address the on-going problem of illegal immigration. It did not contain any forms of
deterrence. By its silence, the legal provision in earlier legislation that exempted employers
from being prosecuted for hiring illegal immigrants was perpetrated. Following its passage,
illegal immigration simply exploded in sca1e.12
What Did Post-1965 Immigration Policy Do?
The most obvious effect of the changes in immigration law that began in 1965 (and
followed by the Refugee Act of 1980, the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, and
the Immigration Act of 1990) has been a significant increase in the size of the foreign born
population. In 1970 the foreign born population (such data were only available at ten year
intervals at the time) was 4.7 percent of the total population-- the lowest percentage since
before the Civil War. By 1990, the Census reported the foreign born population to be 7.9
percent of the population of the u.S. The Census Bureau has updated that estimate, as of
March 1994, to be 8.7 percent of the U.S. population (or about one of every eleven people
in the population).13 But as research has also shown, the immigrant population is younger
than is the native born population and it contains more men than women; hence, the impact
of immigration on the labor force is significantly greater than is revealed by pQpulation
statistics. Indeed, in March 1994 the foreign born accounted for 10.8 percent of the labor
force (or one of every nine members of the U.S. labor force).14 As always, these figures
7must be viewed as minimal rates as there is a sizable undercount of the number of illegal
immigrants present in the country. Some illegals are counted (no one knows how many,
although several estimates have been made to approximate the figure) but it is still believed
that many are not. IS
The foreign born population has increased from 9.6 million persons in 1970 to 22.8
million persons in 1994. Of the 1994 foreign born population, 4.5 million arrived within the
last 5 years-- or about 900,000 immigrants a year plus whatever the annual undercount of
illegal immigrants may be. The actual inflow has certainly exceeded a million a year in most
of the 1980s and all of the 1990s to date. The inflow, however, has been exceedingly
uneven in terms of where the immigrants have come from. Twenty-eight percent of the
entire foreign born population of the nation in 1994 came from only one country --Mexico.
These aggregate figures and percentages are for the nation as a whole. They mask
the key descriptive characteristics of the immigration phenomenon: its geographic
concentration. Five states (California, New York, Florida, Texas, and Illinois) account for
65 percent of the entire foreign born population and 68 percent of the entire foreign born
labor force. It is also the case that the foreign born are overwhelmingly concentrated in only
a handful of urban areas. But these particular labor markets are among the nation's largest
in size, which greatly increases the significance of their concentration. These five
metropolitan areas in 1994 were Los Angeles, New York, Miami, Chicago, and Washington,
D.C. Collectively, they accounted for 51 percent of all foreign born workers in 1994. The
concentration in the central cities of the nation is even more extreme. The 1990 Census, for
instance, revealed that that percentage of the population that is foreign born of Miami was 60
8percent; in New York City 28 percent; for Los Angeles, 38 percent; for San Francisco, 34
percent; and for Chicago, 17 percent. The percentage of the labor force that was foreign
born, of course, would be higher than these population percentages.
The flow of immigrants into the United States has tended to be bimodal in terms of
their human capital attributes (as measured by educational attainment) but the highest
concentration is in the lowest end of the nation's human capital distribution. The 1990
Census revealed that the percentage of foreign born adults (25 years and over) who had less
than a 9th grade education was 25 percent (compared to only 10 percent for native born
adults) and whereas 23 percent of native born adults did not have a high school diploma, 42
percent of foreign born adults did not. Immigration, therefore, is a major contributor to the
nation's adult illiteracy program. On the other hand, both foreign born adults and native
born adults had the same percentage of persons who had a bachelor's degree or higher (20.3
percent and 20.4 percent respectively) but with regard to those who had graduate degrees,
foreign born adults had a considerately higher percentage than did the native born, 3.8
percent versus 2.4 percent. Thus, it is at both ends of the U.S. labor force that immigration
has its impacts --at the bottom and at the top of the economic ladder. In the low skilled
labor market, immigration has increased the competition for whatever jobs are available. In
recent years, unskilled jobs have not been increasing as fast as have the number of unskilled
workers. As for skilled jobs, immigration can be useful in the short run as a means of
providing qualified workers where shortages of qualified domestic workers exist. But, the
long term objective should be that these jobs should go to citizen and resident aliens. No
industry should have unlimited access to the possibility of recruiting immigrant and non-
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immigrant workers. Shortages should be signals to the nation's education and training
system to provide such workers and for private employers to initiate actions to overcome
these shortages. They should not be excuses to increase skilled immigration ~.
The effects of the human capital variation between the foreign born and native born,
not surprisingly, are reflected in a comparison of their 1994 occupational distributions.
Twenty-six percent of the foreign born were employed in the low skilled and semi-skilled
occupations as operatives, laborers, or farming workers (compared to 17 percent of native
born workers).
The disproportionate concentration of the foreign born who lack even a high school
diploma is also reflected in their unemployment experiences. The overall unemployment rate
of foreign born workers in 1994 was 9.2 percent while the comparable national
unemployment rate at the time was 6.5 percent. Consequently, one firm finding is .that
immigration is pulling up the national unemployment rate. The unemployment rate for
foreign born workers with less than a ninth grade education in 1994 was 13 percent; for
those with some high school but no diploma, it was 15.2 percent. The comparable rates for
native born workers were 13.5 percent and 29.9 percent. Consequently, the greatest labor
market impact of immigration is in the sector of the labor market that is already having the
greatest difficult finding employment. It is, therefore, the least skilled segment of the labor
force (using educational attainment as the usual proxy for skill) who are bearing the brunt of
the direct job competition with immigrant workers. There certainly is no shortage of
unskilled native born workers as indicated by their high unemployment rates and by the
number of adult illiterates (estimated to be over 27 million adults).
10
As for the racial and ethnic composition of the immigration phenomenon, immigrants
from Asia and Latin America overwhelmingly dominate the current inflow. Immigrants from
Asia and Latin America account for over 80 percent of the post-1965 immigrants. Indeed,
Asia emerged in the 1990s as the primary source region. As of March, 1994, 62 percent or
the Asian population of the United States were foreign born with 92 percent of such persons
entering the United States since 1970. As for the Hispanic population, 39 percent were
foreign born in 1994. As for the labor market impact, there is no labor force data collected
for Asians on a regular basis. The immigration impact, however, must be the overriding
.'labor force characteristic of that group. As for Hispanics. this is clearly the case. In 1994,
over one half the Hispanic labor force was foreign born (51.2 percent). It is the only group,
for which labor force data are collected, where this is the case. In contrast, only 3 percent
of the non-Hispanic white labor force was foreign born and only 4 percent of the black non-
Hispanic labor force in 1994 were foreign born. Thus, the most distinguishing feature of the
Hispanic labor force is the proportion that is foreign born. Thus, immigration is significantly
altering the racial and ethnic composition of both the nation's population and labor force.
The 1990 Census also disclosed that 79.1 percent of the foreign born population (5
years old and over) speak a language other than English (compared to 7.8 percent of the
native born) and that 47.0 percent of the foreign born (5 years old and over) reported that
they do not speak English "very well". The ability to speak English in an increasingly
service-oriented economy has been definitively linked to the ability to advance in the U.S.
labor market of the post-1965 era.16
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For these reasons and others, it should come as no great revelation that the incidence
of poverty among families of the foreign born population in 1990 was fifty percent higher
than that of native born families or that 25 percent of the families with a foreign born
householder who entered the country since 1980 were living in poverty in 1990.
Nor is it surprising to find that immigrant families make greater use of welfare than
do native born families.I? Worst of all, of course, is the fact that children raised in poverty
have a bleak future in the labor market of the 1990s and that of the next century. It also
means that immigration policy has retarded efforts to combat poverty in the United States
more difficult and played into the hands of politicians who criticize the effects of post-1960
anti-poverty efforts.
The human capital deficiencies of adult immigrants has dire intergenerational
consequences on the preparation of their children to become future workers. It is estimated
that two million immigrant youth enrolled in u.S. public schools in the 1980s. Studies of
these immigrant children indicate that they are "twice as likely to be poor as compared to all
students, thereby straining local school resources. "IS Moreover, "many immigrants,
including those of high school age, have had little or no schooling and are illiterate even in
their native languages.,,19 New demands for the creation of bilingual programs and special
urban education classes have added to the costs of education and have frequently led to the
diversion of funds from other important programs for other needy children.2O Overcrowding
of urban school systems, already confronting enormous educational burdens, has frequently
occurred with devastating impacts on the educational process. 21 Other educational costs to
social policy are more subtle but equally as significant as the fmancial concerns. Namely,
12
the societal goal of desegregated urban schools has been greatly retarded by the arrival of
immigrant children because it has increased the racial isolation of inner-city black children.22
There is also the issue of job competition. It is the hardest to prove. Yet, it is
probably the most contentious issue surrounding aily assessment of what has happened since
mass immigration in the post-1965 era. Logic would indicate that, if immigrants are
disproportionately concentrated in the nation's largest urban labor markets and if foreign
born workers are disproportionately lacking in human capital attributes, and if they are
overwhelmingly minority group members themselves, it would be similarly situated native
born workers (actual and potential) who experience the greatest competition with immigrants
for jobs. But developing a methodology to measure displacement has proven to be an
insurmountable feat. Not only is it impossible to prove that if one person is hired, someone
else has been displaced, but even such a straight forward approach would not settle. the issue
even if it were feasible. For as George Borjas has said, there is no way to ascertain who
else would have moved to the high-immigrant impact cities if the immigrants were not
pouring into those labor markets. 23 Moreover, he notes there is no way to measure the
number of people who have left these same loca1labor markets in despair who might
otherwise have retained their jobs or had higher wages if not for the presence of newly
arrived immigrants. Other research confirms his views. Post-1965 immigration has been
found to have reduced the internal immigration patterns of the native-born labor force to the
urban areas where immigrants are concentrated.24 Still other research has found that
immigrants themselves are less likely to move out of states where they are concentrated than
are the native born.25 Both features can cause the accentuation of the impact on those labor
13
markets where immigrants are concentrated. Furthermore, research shows in those urban
cities in California that have experienced quantum increases in immigration have seen the
"flight" of low income, poorly educated citizen workers out of their former communities to
outer fringes of their metropolitan areas or to other states.26 This means that they lost the
competitive struggle for jobs with low skilled, poorly educated immigrants and it means that
these other labor markets are now non-confronted with trying to accommodate these outflows
of unskilled citizen and resident alien job seekers.
The same can be said of wage rates. If the immigrants had not entered these local
labor markets in substantial numbers, wages might have risen which would have attracted
citizens to move-in or to stay-in these cities. In the 1920s, for instance, when immigration
was first regulated, millions of native born workers in rural areas from the South and the
Prairie States moved to the expanding urban labor markets of the North and West; .the same
thing happened in the 1940s when the war stopped immigration. Why did it not happen
during the 1980s when, for example, billions of defense dollars poured into Southern
California?
While the direct displacement issue cannot be definitively resolved, the substitution of
immigrant workers for native born workers can be described. Unfortunately, this type of
work requires case studies of occupational patterns in high immigrant impact cities. Few
have been conducted. One excellent study in southern California clearly documented the
situation whereby black janitorial workers, who had successfully built a strong union in the
1970s that provided high wages and good working conditions, were almost totally displaced
14
by Hispanic immigrants in the 1980s who were willing to work for far lower pay and with
few benefits. Tl More such case research is desperately needed.
Finally, but without question, the most serious finding concerning post-1965
immigration is the adverse effect it has had on income distribution. It has taken a long time
for the U.S. government to acknowledge the harmful influence immigration policy has had
on this critical indicator of national well-being. In the Economic Report of the President:
1994, however, it is stated that "immigration has increased the relative supply of less
educated labor and appears to have contributed to the increasing inequality of income" in the
United States.28 This is the first official government statement, to my knowledge, that
recognizes the adverse economic effects that contemporary U.S. immigration policy has
exerted on the U.S. economy since mass immigration was accidentally revived in 1965. This
acknowledgment of what has transpired was followed by a qualifying observation that "the
effect has been small." Unfortunately, as already discussed, immigration is highly
concentrated in its geographic impacts. If the negative effects of immigration on income
distribution show-up at the national level, it can be safely concluded that the local effects of
immigration on income distribution have to be significantly worse in order to offset the
aggregation effects of the massive domination of this economic index by the majority of
persons who are not immigrants. Hence, whether the effect of immigration policy on the
distribution of national income is "small" or not is a matter of contention; that its effects are
adverse to the national interest are not.
Concluding Observations
The Immigration Act of 1965 did succeed in ending the racial and ethnic
15
discrimination that had characterized and dominated the nation's immigration system since
1924. But it introduced a new form of discrimination in its place --nepotism. As the noted
immigration scholar, John Higham has pointed out, family reunification serves to "reinforce
and perpetuate existing patterns of immigration II which instead of opening a way for
prospective leaders, striking out on their own to make a new life, grants preference to
followers, pursuing the family chain."29 Higham notes, however, that just as with the earlier
national origins admission system, "the family preference scheme [has] a stubborn
consistency in the ethnic groups that believe they benefit from it. 1130Hence, it is politically
difficult to convert present immigration policy that was created in 1965 into one that serves
the national interest.
Moreover, when one reflects back over all the events that have occurred since the
passage of the Immigration Act of 1965, one finds a story of unintended consequences. All
of the assurances by the advocates of the legislation of things that would not happen did, in
fact, happen. Supposedly, those assurances were made because they were 11Qtdesirable
outcomes.
Thus, by any normal standard used to evaluate public policy, the available research
shows that the Immigration Act of 1965 has failed. It has done precisely what its proponents
said it would not do. Prevailing immigration policy in the 1990s is still based essentially on
the elements contained in the Immigration Act of 1965. Consequently it is not serving the
national interest. It is not surprising, therefore, that major reforms are currently being
proposed in Congress. They are long overdue.
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